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The	  2008	  bailout	  is	  often	  taken	  as	  evidence	  of	  the	  domination	  of	  the	  American	  political	  
system	  by	  large	  financial	  institutions.	  	  In	  fact,	  the	  bailout	  demonstrated	  the	  vulnerability	  
of	  American	  banks	  to	  government	  pressure.	  Large	  banks	  in	  the	  United	  States	  could	  not	  
defy	  regulators,	  because	  their	  future	  income	  depended	  on	  the	  American	  market.	  In	  
Britain,	  by	  contrast,	  one	  bank	  succeeded	  in	  scuttling	  the	  preferred	  governmental	  solution	  
of	  an	  industry-­‐wide	  recapitalization,	  because	  most	  of	  its	  revenue	  came	  from	  outside	  the	  
United	  Kingdom.	  This	  was	  an	  exercise	  of	  structural	  power,	  but	  one	  that	  most	  
contemporary	  scholarship	  on	  business	  power	  ignores	  or	  misclassifies,	  since	  it	  limits	  
structural	  power	  to	  the	  automatic	  adjustment	  of	  policy	  to	  the	  possibility	  of	  disinvestment.	  
We	  show	  that	  structural	  power	  can	  be	  exercised	  strategically,	  that	  it	  is	  distinct	  from	  
instrumental	  power	  based	  on	  lobbying,	  and	  that	  it	  explains	  consequential	  variations	  in	  
bailout	  design	  in	  the	  UK,	  US,	  France,	  and	  Germany.	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I.	  Introduction	  
Moments	  of	  political	  crisis	  throw	  into	  relief	  the	  underlying	  power	  conflicts	  in	  society.	  The	  
colossal	  transfer	  of	  risks	  from	  big	  banks	  to	  American	  and	  British	  taxpayers	  in	  2008	  –	  in	  
the	  service	  of	  preventing	  a	  financial	  meltdown	  –	  is	  perhaps	  the	  best	  recent	  example	  of	  this	  
phenomenon.	  Scholars	  and	  former	  officials	  have	  pointed	  to	  the	  American	  bailout	  as	  a	  
case	  of	  crony	  capitalism	  run	  amok.1	  A	  Republican	  Treasury	  Secretary	  and	  former	  head	  of	  
Goldman	  Sachs	  gave	  the	  largest	  nine	  banks	  $125	  billion	  to	  keep	  the	  system	  of	  credit	  from	  
freezing	  up.	  The	  banks	  got	  the	  money,	  none	  of	  their	  CEOs	  was	  fired,	  and	  attempts	  to	  
channel	  some	  of	  the	  aid	  toward	  mortgage	  relief	  for	  the	  broader	  economy	  were	  in	  vain.	  
Meanwhile,	  in	  the	  United	  Kingdom,	  a	  Labour	  government	  injected	  $111	  billion	  into	  two	  of	  
its	  largest	  banks.	  That	  help	  came	  at	  a	  steep	  price,	  as	  the	  government	  fired	  the	  CEOs	  of	  
these	  banks,	  while	  ensuring	  that	  healthier	  British	  banks	  shored	  up	  their	  balance	  sheets	  
independently	  of	  government	  funding.	  The	  UK	  government	  seemed	  more	  punitive	  than	  
the	  US	  government	  while	  being	  more	  conservative	  with	  taxpayer	  money,	  a	  result	  that	  
presumptively	  reflects	  the	  greater	  power	  of	  American	  banks	  in	  the	  US	  political	  system.	  	  
	  
This,	  at	  least,	  is	  the	  conventional	  story	  of	  the	  American	  and	  British	  bailouts.2	  It	  is	  wrong,	  
both	  in	  its	  claims	  that	  the	  UK	  government	  drove	  a	  better	  bargain	  for	  the	  taxpayers	  with	  
its	  large	  banks	  and	  that	  the	  US	  bank	  bailout	  reflects	  the	  domination	  of	  the	  US	  
government	  by	  large	  financial	  institutions.	  In	  fact,	  the	  US	  government	  got	  a	  better	  deal	  
from	  its	  banks	  than	  did	  the	  British	  government,	  and	  it	  did	  so	  because	  American	  banks	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wielded	  less	  power	  than	  their	  British	  counterparts.	  Why	  has	  the	  conventional	  wisdom	  so	  
misunderstood	  the	  character	  of	  the	  American	  and	  British	  bank	  bailouts?	  Observers	  have	  
focused	  on	  the	  generosity	  of	  bailout	  terms,	  including	  the	  firing	  of	  the	  chief	  executives,	  of	  
weak	  banks:	  those	  on	  the	  brink	  of	  insolvency.	  However,	  the	  important	  difference	  between	  
the	  British	  and	  American	  bailouts	  lies	  in	  the	  terms	  imposed	  on	  healthy	  (clearly	  solvent)	  
large	  banks.	  Financially	  strapped	  banks	  could	  not	  challenge	  the	  government	  in	  either	  
country.	  They	  had	  to	  accept	  whatever	  policy	  the	  government	  offered,	  because	  only	  with	  
government	  aid	  could	  they	  have	  survived.	  But	  healthy	  banks	  were	  not	  dependent	  on	  state	  
aid.	  Healthy	  banks	  in	  Britain	  were	  in	  a	  better	  position	  to	  resist	  the	  state,	  and	  they	  drove	  a	  
better	  deal	  for	  themselves,	  than	  did	  American	  banks.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  British	  government	  
absorbed	  more	  risk	  than	  the	  US	  government	  and	  lost	  taxpayer	  money,	  while	  effectively	  
providing	  a	  costless	  subsidy	  to	  its	  healthy	  banks,	  which	  benefited	  from	  the	  stabilization	  
provided	  by	  the	  bailouts.	  In	  contrast,	  the	  US	  made	  a	  profit	  from	  its	  bank	  bailout,	  because	  
it	  was	  able	  to	  bully	  healthy	  large	  banks	  such	  as	  JP	  Morgan	  and	  Wells	  Fargo	  into	  a	  
collective	  recapitalization	  plan.	  
	  
Theoretically,	  we	  return	  to	  a	  fundamental	  debate	  about	  the	  role	  of	  business	  in	  politics.3	  
The	  bailouts	  illustrate	  how	  social	  scientists	  have	  focused	  on	  the	  instrumental	  power	  of	  
banks	  while	  ignoring	  their	  structural	  power.	  Instrumental	  power	  includes	  lobbying	  
capacity	  and	  campaign	  donations;	  on	  these	  measures,	  the	  United	  States	  looks	  like	  an	  
especially	  captured	  system.4	  But	  when	  looking	  at	  the	  structural	  power	  of	  banks	  –	  which	  
we	  operationalize	  as	  their	  ability	  to	  defy	  national	  regulators	  because	  of	  the	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internationalization	  of	  their	  markets	  –	  the	  situation	  of	  banks	  in	  the	  US	  and	  the	  UK	  
changes	  dramatically.	  Because	  all	  the	  large	  banks	  in	  the	  US	  rely	  on	  the	  American	  market	  
for	  their	  future	  revenues,	  they	  enjoy	  less	  structural	  power	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  American	  
government	  than	  do	  their	  counterparts	  in	  other	  countries,	  such	  as	  the	  UK,	  that	  do	  not	  
depend	  heavily	  on	  a	  given	  domestic	  market.	  	  
	  
In	  the	  next	  section	  we	  discuss	  the	  distinction	  between	  structural	  and	  instrumental	  power	  
of	  business,	  arguing	  that	  recent	  scholarship	  has	  neglected	  structural	  power	  because	  it	  has	  
not	  conceptualized	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  structural	  power	  can	  be	  used	  strategically.	  Section	  
III	  explicates	  our	  methodological	  approach,	  which	  employs	  evidence	  from	  the	  structure	  of	  
the	  banking	  sectors	  in	  the	  United	  States	  and	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  and	  from	  process-­‐
tracing,	  in	  which	  we	  use	  interviews	  with	  senior	  policymakers	  to	  evaluate	  our	  claims	  about	  
the	  power	  of	  American	  and	  British	  banks	  in	  negotiating	  with	  their	  governments.5	  	  Section	  
IV	  evaluates	  the	  policy	  design	  of	  the	  two	  bailouts,	  and	  Section	  V	  tests	  hypotheses	  of	  
structural	  and	  instrumental	  power	  of	  banks	  against	  the	  evidence	  of	  policy	  development	  in	  
the	  two	  cases.	  A	  penultimate	  section	  extends	  the	  argument	  comparatively	  to	  bailouts	  in	  





II.	  Two	  Dimensions	  of	  Business	  Power	  
To	  understand	  the	  character	  of	  business	  influence	  on	  important	  policy	  outcomes	  such	  as	  
the	  bank	  bailouts	  of	  2008,	  we	  revisit	  the	  conceptual	  distinction	  between	  the	  structural	  
and	  instrumental	  power	  of	  business.	  Instrumental	  power	  comprises	  the	  various	  means,	  
unrelated	  to	  the	  core	  functions	  of	  the	  firm,	  through	  which	  business	  influences	  politics:	  	  
donations	  for	  campaigns,	  privileged	  access	  to	  policymakers,	  and	  lobbyists	  and	  
organizations	  that	  defend	  business	  interests.6	  Structural	  power,	  by	  contrast,	  inheres	  in	  
the	  fact	  that	  firms	  are	  agents	  of	  economic	  activity	  in	  capitalist	  democracies.	  Because	  the	  
state	  relies	  on	  firm	  investment	  to	  generate	  growth,	  the	  ability	  of	  companies	  not	  to	  invest	  
can	  cause	  damage	  to	  the	  economy	  and	  thereby	  to	  the	  politicians	  governing	  it.	  Since	  a	  
negative	  policy,	  or	  even	  the	  anticipation	  of	  one,	  may	  lead	  firms	  to	  lower	  their	  rate	  of	  
investment,	  scholars	  have	  characterized	  the	  democratic	  state	  as	  structurally	  dependent	  
on	  capital.7	  Governments	  are	  predisposed	  to	  adopt	  policies	  that	  promote	  firm	  investment,	  
even	  without	  business	  leaders	  necessarily	  having	  to	  do	  anything.8	  	  
	  
Scholarship	  from	  the	  1970s	  and	  1980s	  recognized	  the	  fact	  that	  this	  structural	  power	  –	  for	  
example,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  coordinated	  “capital	  strikes”	  –	  could	  be	  exercised	  strategically	  by	  
business	  as	  part	  of	  a	  campaign	  to	  change	  government	  policies.9	  Yet	  a	  strange	  thing	  
happened	  to	  the	  literature	  on	  business	  power:	  as	  the	  influence	  of	  neoliberal	  ideas	  waxed	  
in	  the	  advanced	  capitalist	  countries,	  analytical	  attention	  to	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  business	  
exercises	  influence	  on	  the	  state	  waned.	  In	  this	  process,	  the	  concept	  of	  structural	  power	  as	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a	  resource	  that	  could	  be	  used	  strategically	  by	  business	  disappeared	  from	  the	  literature,	  to	  
be	  replaced	  by	  a	  version	  of	  structural	  power	  that	  operated	  only	  as	  an	  automatic	  
adjustment	  of	  the	  level	  of	  investment,	  which	  would	  punish	  politicians	  who	  adopted	  
policies	  to	  which	  business	  is	  averse,	  and	  whose	  anticipation	  therefore	  would	  deter	  
adoption	  of	  the	  policy	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  Charles	  Lindblom	  may	  in	  this	  sense	  have	  been	  a	  
victim	  of	  his	  own	  rhetorical	  success	  in	  describing	  business	  disinvestment	  as	  the	  
“automatic	  punishing	  recoil”	  mechanism	  through	  which	  business	  disciplines	  
government.10	  By	  the	  1990s,	  the	  relatively	  scarce	  political	  science	  scholarship	  that	  used	  
the	  term	  structural	  power	  conceptualized	  it	  exclusively	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  the	  automatic	  
reaction	  of	  policymakers	  to	  the	  investment	  decisions	  of	  companies.11	  When	  current	  
scholars	  of	  business	  write	  about	  “capital	  strikes”	  that	  involve	  any	  deliberate	  action,	  they	  
now	  classify	  them	  as	  instrumental	  power	  –	  erroneously,	  in	  our	  view.12	  Where	  capital	  
strikes	  involve	  coordinated	  political	  action	  among	  companies,	  the	  power	  exercised	  by	  
business	  flows	  directly	  from	  the	  role	  of	  the	  capital	  holder	  in	  the	  economy	  and	  its	  growth	  
and	  employment	  capacities,	  not	  from	  the	  investment	  in	  lobbying	  offices	  or	  trade	  
associations.	  
	  	  
For	  political	  scientists,	  this	  means	  that	  structural	  power	  as	  a	  causal	  variable	  is	  now	  only	  
conceptualized	  as	  a	  background	  condition	  against	  which	  politics	  plays	  out,	  not	  as	  an	  
active	  resource	  employed	  by	  business	  in	  the	  political	  arena.	  Thus,	  when	  Jacob	  Hacker	  and	  
Paul	  Pierson	  attempted	  to	  revive	  analytical	  interest	  in	  the	  concept	  of	  structural	  power	  in	  
an	  influential	  2002	  article,	  they	  argued	  that	  federal	  political	  systems	  increased	  the	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structural	  power	  of	  business	  by	  giving	  companies	  easy	  exit	  options.13	  However,	  even	  
Pierson	  and	  Hacker	  bought	  into	  the	  prevailing	  definition	  of	  structural	  power,	  arguing	  
that	  this	  “power	  is	  structural	  because	  the	  pressure	  to	  protect	  business	  interests	  is	  
generated	  automatically	  and	  apolitically.”14	  Thus,	  “the	  extent	  to	  which	  business	  influences	  
specific	  policy	  choices	  will	  be	  a	  function	  of	  instrumental	  rather	  than	  structural	  power”	  
because	  the	  possibility	  of	  disinvestment	  “can	  set	  the	  agenda	  for	  governments	  and	  help	  to	  
define	  (or	  rule	  out)	  alternatives,	  but	  this	  signal	  cannot	  tell	  governments	  what	  to	  do.”15	  In	  
this	  now	  typical	  formulation,	  structural	  power	  sits	  in	  the	  background	  of	  agenda-­‐setting,	  
while	  instrumental	  power	  does	  the	  hard	  causal	  work	  on	  specific	  pieces	  of	  legislation.16	  	  
	  
Following	  this	  line	  of	  thinking,	  scholars,	  journalists,	  and	  former	  regulators	  examining	  the	  
American	  bank	  bailout	  have	  converged	  on	  a	  similar	  diagnosis:	  the	  government	  bailed	  out	  
the	  banks	  because	  they	  enjoyed	  privileged	  access	  to	  Washington’s	  policymakers.17	  Banks	  
have	  consolidated	  this	  Washington-­‐Wall	  Street	  axis	  by	  donating	  so	  much	  money	  to	  
Republicans	  and	  Democrats	  that	  both	  parties	  work	  in	  the	  interest	  of	  large	  financial	  
institutions.18	  Their	  special	  influence	  is	  reinforced	  by	  the	  infamous	  revolving	  door,	  which	  
circulates	  policymakers	  into	  lucrative	  jobs	  in	  banks	  and	  bankers	  into	  public	  office.19	  	  
	  
We	  argue	  that	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  bailouts	  can	  only	  be	  understood	  by	  reference	  to	  the	  
structural	  power	  of	  big	  banks	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  governments.	  Much	  contemporary	  research	  is	  
blind	  to	  this	  fact	  because	  many	  scholars	  have	  collapsed	  structural	  power	  into	  the	  much	  
narrower	  category	  of	  “structural	  power	  that	  works	  automatically	  through	  the	  anticipation	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of	  policymakers.”	  Although	  structural	  power	  can	  certainly	  work	  automatically,	  it	  can	  also	  
be	  deployed	  deliberately,	  with	  strategic	  intent.	  In	  fact,	  both	  structural	  and	  instrumental	  
power	  have	  automatic	  aspects,	  in	  that	  they	  require	  no	  conscious	  activation	  in	  order	  to	  
function.	  Disinvestment	  and	  the	  possibility	  of	  exit	  are	  the	  most	  prominent	  features	  of	  the	  
structural	  power	  of	  business;	  both	  work	  automatically,	  through	  the	  anticipation	  of	  
policymakers.	  But	  the	  instrumental	  power	  of	  business	  in	  capitalist	  democracies	  includes	  
the	  presence	  of	  decision-­‐makers	  who,	  by	  virtue	  of	  their	  background,	  are	  friendly	  to	  
business.20	  This	  is	  a	  resource	  that	  helps	  business,	  whether	  companies	  take	  any	  action	  or	  
not.	  A	  similar	  sort	  of	  instrumental	  power	  arises	  from	  career	  ladders	  that	  involve	  a	  
‘revolving	  door’	  between	  senior	  positions	  in	  government	  and	  the	  private	  sector.21	  These	  
operate	  automatically	  in	  the	  individual	  calculus	  of	  decision-­‐makers.	  Such	  considerations	  
are	  correctly	  classified	  as	  elements	  of	  instrumental	  power,	  just	  like	  lobbying	  organizations	  
and	  campaign	  contributions,	  because	  they	  involve	  influence	  on	  decision-­‐makers	  that	  is	  
based	  on	  something	  other	  than	  the	  function	  of	  private	  firms	  in	  a	  capitalist	  economy.	  
	  
As	  this	  discussion	  suggests,	  there	  are	  in	  fact	  two	  dimensions	  of	  business	  power,	  which	  
previous	  work	  has	  combined	  into	  the	  single	  dichotomy	  between	  structural	  and	  
instrumental	  power.	  The	  first	  refers	  to	  the	  source	  of	  power:	  structural	  power	  flows	  from	  
the	  economic	  position	  of	  the	  firm	  in	  an	  economy,	  whereas	  instrumental	  power	  flows	  from	  
resources	  extrinsic	  to	  the	  core	  economic	  activity	  of	  the	  firm.	  If	  we	  imagine	  business	  as	  a	  
poker	  player,	  structural	  power	  refers	  to	  the	  cards	  she	  holds	  in	  her	  hand.	  Instrumental	  
power	  refers	  to	  everything	  beyond	  the	  cards	  –	  from	  the	  quality	  of	  her	  poker	  face	  to	  the	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incentives	  of	  her	  poker	  companions	  to	  let	  her	  win	  because	  she	  might	  be	  able	  to	  offer	  
them	  a	  job	  in	  the	  future.	  
	  
The	  second	  dimension	  of	  business	  power,	  which	  the	  past	  twenty-­‐five	  years	  of	  scholarship	  
has	  ignored,	  refers	  to	  the	  way	  in	  which	  these	  resources	  are	  mobilized	  by	  business:	  
automatically	  or	  strategically	  (through	  deliberate	  choice).	  Automatic	  capacities	  require	  
no	  action	  on	  the	  part	  of	  business.	  They	  work	  through	  the	  anticipation	  of	  the	  object	  of	  
possible	  action:	  in	  this	  case,	  policymakers,	  who	  fear	  the	  possibility	  of	  disinvestment	  and	  
change	  policy	  spontaneously.	  Strategic	  capacities,	  by	  contrast,	  do	  have	  to	  be	  deliberately	  
exercised	  in	  order	  to	  be	  effective.	  Lobbying	  organizations	  and	  campaign	  contributions	  are	  
intentional	  efforts	  by	  business	  to	  get	  something	  from	  policymakers;	  but	  so	  too	  is	  the	  
bargaining	  position	  adopted	  by	  large	  firms	  when	  negotiating	  with	  policymakers.	  Whether	  
business	  leaders	  have	  bought	  access	  or	  not	  is	  a	  past	  product	  of	  their	  strategic	  
instrumental	  capacities.	  But,	  in	  any	  given	  negotiation,	  their	  bargaining	  position	  itself	  is	  a	  
product	  of	  the	  structural	  position	  of	  their	  firms.	  If	  the	  poker	  play	  is	  holding	  a	  straight	  
flush,	  it	  doesn’t	  matter	  whether	  or	  not	  she	  has	  a	  good	  poker	  face.	  She	  is	  likely	  to	  win	  the	  
hand.	  Those	  who	  would	  require	  structural	  power	  to	  work	  through	  the	  automatic	  
adjustment	  of	  policymaker	  preferences	  assume	  that	  she	  will	  win	  the	  hand	  as	  a	  result	  of	  
the	  other	  players	  automatically	  folding.	  We	  argue	  that	  the	  act	  of	  putting	  one’s	  cards	  on	  
the	  table	  is	  a	  deliberate	  use	  of	  the	  cards,	  one	  that	  requires	  the	  exercise	  of	  some	  agency	  on	  




Table	  1	  portrays	  the	  intersection	  of	  these	  two	  dimensions.	  The	  columns	  distinguish	  
strategic	  from	  automatic	  aspects	  of	  business	  power,	  while	  the	  rows	  separate	  instrumental	  
from	  structural	  power.	  The	  difference	  between	  automatic	  and	  strategic	  structural	  power	  
lies	  in	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  structural	  role	  of	  a	  company	  in	  the	  economy	  has	  an	  effect	  on	  
policy.	  Is	  power	  exercised	  through	  the	  policymaker’s	  anticipation	  of	  a	  business	  logic	  (i.e.,	  
“it	  is	  not	  worth	  it	  for	  us	  as	  a	  company	  to	  produce	  widgets	  at	  tax	  rate	  x”)?	  Or	  does	  it	  
instead	  result	  from	  the	  deliberate	  use	  of	  economic	  power	  (i.e.,	  “we	  as	  a	  company	  refuse	  to	  
do	  what	  the	  government	  asks	  us	  to	  do,	  and	  we	  cannot	  by	  forced	  by	  the	  government	  to	  do	  
it”)?	  Disinvestment	  (or	  exit),	  which	  works	  through	  its	  anticipation	  by	  policymakers,	  is	  an	  
automatic	  resource.	  Strategic	  structural	  power	  is	  a	  bargaining	  resource,	  one	  that	  has	  to	  be	  
invoked	  if	  a	  bank	  wants	  to	  deter	  a	  government’s	  preferred	  policy.	  
	  




Table	  1.	  	   Two	  Dimensions	  of	  Business	  Power	  
	   Strategic	   Automatic	  
Instrumental	   Organizational	  Lobbying	  
Campaign	  Contributions	  
Pro-­‐Business	  Policymakers	  
Public-­‐Private	  Revolving	  Door	  
Structural	   Outside	  Option	   Disinvestment	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Borrowing	  the	  language	  of	  game	  theory,	  we	  describe	  this	  resource	  as	  an	  outside	  option:	  
the	  payoff	  the	  bank	  gets	  if	  it	  refuses	  the	  deal	  on	  offer	  from	  the	  state.	  The	  outside	  option	  is	  
not	  necessarily	  a	  threat	  to	  exit;	  it	  is	  to	  have	  enough	  alternative	  business	  revenue	  to	  be	  
able	  to	  ignore	  the	  threat	  of	  regulatory	  sanctions	  in	  one	  jurisdiction.22	  The	  outside	  option	  
of	  large	  banks	  depends	  on	  how	  much	  state	  policymakers	  can	  credibly	  threaten	  to	  
influence	  their	  future	  income	  stream.	  The	  existence	  of	  a	  plausible	  outside	  option	  confers	  
on	  large	  companies	  a	  degree	  of	  regulatory	  impunity.	  
	  
Regulatory	  authorities	  in	  profitable	  jurisdictions	  have	  their	  own	  power	  over	  banks,	  one	  
little	  remarked	  on	  in	  the	  current	  literature:	  the	  ability	  to	  impose	  future	  costs.	  From	  a	  legal	  
perspective,	  it	  is	  very	  easy	  for	  banks	  to	  leave	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  or	  the	  United	  States.	  
Exiting	  those	  countries,	  however,	  means	  sacrificing	  the	  profits	  to	  be	  made	  there.	  And	  
there	  are	  substantial	  gains	  to	  be	  made	  for	  banks	  operating	  out	  of	  London	  and	  New	  York.	  
Banks	  dependent	  primarily	  on	  their	  profits	  from	  these	  markets	  lack	  a	  viable	  outside	  
option	  in	  bargaining	  with	  the	  state,	  because	  the	  costs	  a	  regulator	  can	  impose	  in	  the	  future	  
dramatically	  lower	  the	  bank’s	  payoff	  if	  it	  refuses	  to	  accept	  the	  state’s	  deal.	  The	  more	  
money	  banks	  expect	  to	  make	  in	  these	  jurisdictions,	  the	  higher	  the	  cost	  of	  crossing	  
regulatory	  authorities.	  The	  strategic	  structural	  power	  individual	  banks	  can	  use	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  
the	  state	  is	  therefore	  a	  function	  of	  the	  dependence	  of	  a	  bank	  on	  the	  domestic	  market.23	  
Structurally	  powerful	  banks	  –	  those	  with	  an	  outside	  option	  –	  are	  those	  that	  earn	  a	  large	  





III.	  Financial	  Crisis	  as	  a	  Test	  Case	  of	  Strategic	  Structural	  Power	  
Unusual	  events	  provide	  the	  opportunity	  to	  test	  the	  empirical	  implications	  of	  rival	  
theories,	  which	  are	  often	  rather	  close	  in	  practice.	  A	  famous	  example	  comes	  from	  the	  fact	  
that	  most	  of	  the	  predictions	  of	  Einstein’s	  theory	  of	  relativity	  resemble	  those	  of	  Newtonian	  
physics.	  One	  key	  distinction	  –	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  gravity	  would	  bend	  light	  –	  could	  only	  
be	  observed	  during	  a	  total	  solar	  eclipse,	  as	  occurred	  in	  1919.	  Einstein’s	  theory	  predicted	  
that	  astronomers	  would	  be	  able	  to	  observe	  distant	  stars	  located	  behind	  the	  sun,	  because	  
the	  sun’s	  gravity	  would	  bend	  the	  light	  around	  the	  sun.	  And	  thus	  the	  theory	  of	  relativity	  
received	  empirical	  support	  that	  was	  difficult	  to	  find	  in	  a	  lab.	  
	  
Financial	  crises	  offer	  similar	  methodological	  advantages	  of	  the	  solar	  eclipse	  for	  purposes	  
of	  empirical	  testing.	  Just	  as	  the	  brightness	  of	  the	  sun	  washed	  out	  the	  ability	  to	  observe	  
stars	  located	  behind	  it,	  so	  too	  does	  the	  glaring	  flow	  of	  money	  into	  politics	  –	  the	  most	  
visible	  weapon	  of	  strategic	  instrumental	  power	  –	  wash	  out	  the	  observable	  effects	  of	  
structural	  power.	  It	  is	  only	  when	  a	  crisis	  of	  substantial	  magnitude	  throws	  into	  clear	  relief	  
the	  contending	  play	  of	  different	  sorts	  of	  business	  power,	  by	  channeling	  government	  
action	  into	  a	  discrete	  number	  of	  negotiations	  between	  banks	  and	  the	  government	  over	  a	  





A	  hypothesis	  derived	  from	  strategic	  structural	  power	  predicts	  variation	  between	  countries	  
if	  some	  have	  large	  banks	  that	  are	  highly	  internationalized	  and	  thus	  capable	  of	  resisting	  
regulatory	  pressure.	  We	  do	  not	  assume	  that	  governments	  automatically	  make	  the	  policy	  
that	  banks	  prefer.	  The	  leaders	  of	  banks	  have	  to	  exercise	  this	  power	  in	  negotiation	  –	  they	  
have	  to	  lay	  their	  cards	  on	  the	  table.	  This	  is	  an	  exercise	  of	  strategic	  structural	  power,	  and	  it	  
is	  a	  prediction	  made	  only	  by	  our	  theory.	  In	  contrast,	  a	  hypothesis	  of	  strategic	  
instrumental	  power	  predicts	  that	  variation	  should	  occur	  between	  countries	  on	  the	  basis	  
of	  where	  businesses	  have	  contributed	  the	  most	  to	  politicians;24	  where	  they	  have	  
developed	  the	  best	  lobbying	  apparatus;25	  or	  where	  they	  are	  most	  likely	  to	  find	  politicians	  
who	  by	  partisan	  disposition	  are	  more	  sympathetic	  to	  the	  interests	  of	  business.26	  If	  these	  
different	  sources	  of	  strategic	  instrumental	  power	  mapped	  differently	  onto	  our	  two	  cases,	  
that	  would	  pose	  a	  problem	  of	  untangling	  different	  causal	  strands	  of	  strategic	  instrumental	  
power.	  Fortunately,	  from	  a	  methodological	  point	  of	  view,	  all	  three	  types	  of	  strategic	  
instrumental	  power	  produce	  the	  same	  prediction	  for	  our	  core	  comparison:	  the	  United	  
States,	  with	  its	  powerful	  lobbying	  groups	  and	  oceans	  of	  money	  from	  finance	  allowed	  to	  
flow	  into	  politics,	  should	  unambiguously	  yield	  an	  outcome	  more	  friendly	  to	  healthy	  banks	  
than	  should	  the	  United	  Kingdom,	  if	  instrumental	  power	  is	  the	  primary	  determinant	  of	  
bank	  bailout	  policy.	  	  
	  
Several	  considerations	  motivate	  our	  primary	  comparison	  between	  the	  US	  and	  the	  UK.	  
The	  two	  countries	  are	  both	  liberal	  market	  economies	  with	  large	  and	  globally	  important	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banks.27	  	  This	  similarity	  holds	  constant	  an	  important	  potential	  source	  of	  variation	  in	  the	  
bailout	  policies	  adopted.	  London	  and	  Wall	  Street	  are	  the	  world’s	  two	  leading	  financial	  
centers,	  and	  the	  bailouts	  in	  these	  two	  countries	  were	  among	  the	  most	  substantively	  
important	  in	  the	  international	  economy.	  The	  different	  policy	  options	  adopted	  in	  the	  US	  
and	  the	  UK	  will	  orient	  future	  policy	  discussions	  around	  the	  design	  of	  bank	  bailouts.	  A	  
further	  objective	  is	  to	  incorporate	  the	  United	  States	  into	  a	  comparative	  political	  analysis	  
of	  how	  banks	  exercise	  political	  power.	  The	  US	  has	  been	  the	  subject	  of	  the	  most	  recent	  
scholarship	  dealing	  with	  the	  political	  power	  of	  financial	  institutions.28	  Yet	  this	  work	  fails	  
to	  compare	  outcomes	  in	  the	  United	  States	  to	  those	  in	  other	  capitalist	  countries.	  The	  
political	  power	  of	  large	  banks	  is	  not	  unique	  to	  the	  US;	  it	  is	  a	  feature	  of	  capitalism.	  Thus,	  
the	  appropriate	  empirical	  question	  is	  not	  “how	  well	  did	  American	  banks	  do	  in	  the	  




IV.	  Bailout	  Policies	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  the	  US	  
Lehman	  Brothers’	  bankruptcy	  on	  September	  15,	  2008	  sent	  shock	  waves	  through	  the	  
international	  financial	  system.	  Other	  financial	  institutions	  failed	  or	  were	  near	  failure	  
within	  days,	  catalyzing	  a	  chain	  reaction	  in	  the	  American	  and	  British	  banking	  sectors.	  
Bank	  of	  America	  took	  over	  the	  investment	  bank	  Merrill	  Lynch.	  The	  Federal	  Reserve	  and	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the	  Treasury	  bailed	  out	  the	  insurance	  giant	  AIG,	  and	  regulators	  closed	  down	  Washington	  
Mutual.	  This	  in	  turn,	  put	  pressure	  on	  Wachovia,	  which	  was	  eventually	  taken	  over	  by	  
Wells	  Fargo.	  A	  week	  after	  the	  Lehman	  failure,	  the	  two	  remaining	  American	  investment	  
banks	  –	  Goldman	  Sachs	  and	  Morgan	  Stanley	  –	  sought	  legal	  conversion	  into	  conventional	  
bank	  holding	  companies.	  	  
	  
In	  Britain,	  Lehman’s	  demise	  similarly	  brought	  two	  British	  banks	  close	  to	  collapse,	  
Bradford	  &	  Bingley	  (B&B)	  and	  HBOS.	  The	  government	  nationalized	  B&B	  and	  transferred	  
its	  deposits	  to	  another	  bank.	  HBOS	  agreed	  to	  merge	  with	  Lloyds	  after	  the	  government	  
granted	  a	  waiver	  of	  competition	  rules.	  The	  UK	  banking	  sector	  had	  been	  marked	  by	  a	  
relatively	  low	  number	  of	  independent	  banks,	  even	  before	  the	  crisis.30	  There	  had	  been	  nine	  
independent	  banks	  in	  the	  index	  of	  the	  largest	  100	  companies	  traded	  in	  London.	  In	  the	  
wake	  of	  the	  Lehman	  bankruptcy,	  only	  five	  were	  left:	  Barclays,	  Royal	  Bank	  of	  Scotland	  
(RBS),	  HSBC,	  Standard	  Chartered,	  and	  Lloyds/HBOS.	  
	  
Facing	  an	  existential	  crisis	  of	  their	  banking	  systems,	  the	  American	  and	  British	  
governments	  both	  intervened	  on	  a	  sector-­‐wide	  scale	  and	  provided	  liquidity,	  debt	  
guarantees	  and	  recapitalizations.	  In	  many	  ways,	  these	  policies	  were	  alike.	  However,	  the	  
US	  plan	  contained	  a	  number	  of	  design	  features	  that	  made	  it	  better,	  from	  the	  perspective	  
of	  the	  government	  and	  the	  taxpayer,	  than	  the	  British	  plan.	  Critics	  of	  the	  American	  plan	  
have	  downplayed	  or	  ignored	  these	  crucial	  elements	  of	  the	  policy.31	  The	  American	  
Treasury	  Secretary,	  Hank	  Paulson,	  managed	  to	  include	  all	  major	  banks	  actively	  in	  the	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plan;	  all	  of	  them	  took	  state	  capital,	  whether	  they	  needed	  it	  or	  not.	  This	  allowed	  Paulson	  
to	  avoid	  putting	  money	  exclusively	  in	  the	  worst	  banks	  and	  to	  finance	  the	  bailout	  through	  
cross-­‐subsidies	  among	  the	  banks.	  	  
	  
In	  the	  repertoire	  of	  bailout	  options,	  there	  are	  two	  different	  sorts	  of	  measures;	  banks	  want	  
one,	  but	  not	  the	  other.	  There	  are	  policies	  that	  help	  banks	  get	  access	  to	  funding,	  which	  the	  
government	  can	  grant	  through	  central	  bank	  liquidity	  or	  through	  guaranteeing	  banks’	  
debt.	  The	  latter	  allows	  troubled	  banks	  to	  get	  loans	  in	  the	  market,	  because	  the	  government	  
stands	  behind	  these	  loans	  and	  will	  pay	  creditors	  were	  the	  bank	  to	  fail.	  This	  is	  what	  every	  
bank	  wants.	  The	  other	  type	  of	  measure	  is	  injecting	  capital;	  that	  is,	  the	  government	  gives	  
money	  to	  the	  bank	  in	  exchange	  for	  shares	  in	  the	  bank.	  Banks	  loathe	  this	  policy,	  because	  
the	  government	  becomes	  their	  shareholder.	  Existing	  shareholders	  take	  a	  hit	  in	  the	  value	  
of	  their	  shares,	  and	  the	  government	  is	  likely	  to	  interfere	  with	  the	  management	  of	  the	  
bank.	  It	  also	  marks	  them	  with	  a	  scarlet	  “B”	  for	  bailout,	  putting	  them	  at	  a	  disadvantage	  in	  
future	  policy	  debates.	  For	  this	  reason,	  banks	  try	  to	  get	  around	  state	  recapitalizations	  
when	  they	  can.	  	  
	  
The	  only	  banks	  that	  can	  avoid	  a	  state	  bailout	  are	  the	  financially	  sound	  banks.	  If	  healthy	  
banks	  achieve	  their	  preferred	  outcome	  of	  avoiding	  state	  recapitalization,	  the	  result	  is	  a	  
poor	  outcome	  for	  the	  government:	  it	  puts	  state	  money	  in	  the	  worst	  banks	  only.	  When	  
banks	  are	  left	  to	  choose	  whether	  to	  raise	  capital	  privately	  or	  to	  take	  it	  from	  the	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government,	  all	  the	  banks	  that	  can	  raise	  private	  money	  will	  do	  so.	  The	  ones	  that	  will	  take	  
state	  capital	  are	  those	  with	  the	  weakest	  financial	  outlook.	  	  
	  
Banks	  asked	  for	  more	  liquidity	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  Atlantic,	  but	  they	  did	  not	  want	  
recapitalizations.32	  Jamie	  Dimon,	  CEO	  of	  JP	  Morgan,	  told	  his	  board	  that	  accepting	  the	  
government’s	  money	  “is	  asymmetrically	  bad	  for	  JP	  Morgan.”33	  In	  the	  UK,	  Fred	  Goodwin	  
from	  RBS	  continuously	  denied	  that	  his	  bank	  had	  solvency	  problems,	  and	  insisted	  it	  
merely	  had	  problems	  of	  liquidity.34	  RBS	  agreed,	  eventually,	  to	  capital	  injections,	  because,	  
as	  one	  observer	  told	  us,	  “they	  were	  wholly	  dependent	  on	  the	  Bank	  of	  England	  for	  cash.	  
And	  they	  weren't	  in	  a	  position	  to	  argue	  about	  the	  terms,	  which	  is	  why	  Fred	  Goodwin	  said,	  
it	  was	  like	  a	  drive-­‐by	  shooting,	  not	  a	  negotiation.”35	  
	  
In	  the	  UK,	  the	  choice	  between	  private	  and	  public	  recapitalization	  clearly	  singled	  out	  the	  
sickly	  banks.	  Standard	  Chartered,	  HSBC	  and	  Barclays	  could	  raise	  private	  capital,	  whereas	  
Lloyds/HBOS	  and	  RBS	  took	  state	  capital	  and	  donned	  the	  scarlet	  B.	  The	  latter	  two	  banks	  
had	  to	  write	  down	  large	  sums;	  the	  government’s	  book	  loss	  a	  year	  later	  was	  £18	  billion	  and	  
rose	  to	  £32	  billion	  in	  2012.36	  	  
	  
The	  second	  reason	  the	  American	  intervention	  was	  better	  for	  the	  government	  is	  that	  it	  
required	  healthy	  banks	  to	  share	  some	  of	  the	  fiscal	  burden,	  while	  the	  British	  program	  did	  
not.	  Whether	  the	  burden	  is	  shared	  depends	  also	  on	  how	  the	  government	  tries	  to	  get	  its	  
money	  back.	  One	  way	  is	  to	  charge	  proportionally	  to	  the	  amount	  of	  help.	  This	  approach	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counters	  “moral	  hazard”	  by	  punishing	  those	  banks	  that	  erred	  and	  encourages	  prudent	  
behavior	  in	  the	  future.	  In	  practice	  this	  means	  asking	  a	  high	  dividend	  in	  exchange	  for	  state	  
capital	  and	  a	  risk-­‐adjusted	  fee	  for	  guarantees.	  Risk-­‐adjusted	  fees	  compensate	  the	  
government	  for	  taking	  more	  risk	  guaranteeing	  debt	  for	  a	  risky	  bank	  than	  guaranteeing	  
the	  debt	  of	  a	  solid	  bank.	  	  The	  effect,	  however,	  is	  to	  leave	  the	  government	  and	  taxpayers	  
worse	  off.	  The	  reason	  is	  that	  the	  owner	  of	  the	  sickly	  banks	  is	  the	  government	  itself;	  
through	  recapitalizations	  it	  invested	  heavily	  in	  those	  banks.	  Charging	  sick	  banks	  heavily	  
for	  interventions	  just	  means	  that	  the	  government	  charges	  itself.	  
	  
Exactly	  such	  an	  outcome	  took	  place	  in	  the	  British	  case.	  The	  government	  started	  out	  
demanding	  a	  12%	  dividend	  from	  RBS	  and	  Lloyds/HBOS.	  Only	  four	  months	  later,	  the	  
government	  put	  more	  capital	  into	  the	  banks	  through	  its	  Asset	  Protection	  Scheme,	  and	  as	  
of	  this	  writing	  it	  is	  still	  in	  the	  red	  from	  its	  investments	  in	  these	  two	  banks.	  	  	  
	  
The	  American	  government	  chose	  another	  way	  to	  get	  is	  money	  back.	  It	  included	  all	  large	  
banks	  and	  charged	  all	  of	  them	  –	  regardless	  of	  how	  risky	  they	  were	  –	  a	  low,	  standard	  fee	  
for	  debt	  guarantees	  and	  capital	  injections.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  however,	  the	  government	  
demanded	  warrants,	  which	  allowed	  it	  during	  the	  next	  ten	  years	  to	  buy	  more	  shares	  at	  the	  
price	  they	  had	  at	  the	  end	  of	  September	  2008.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  government	  could	  get	  
its	  money	  back	  when	  the	  banks	  recovered	  from	  crisis.	  This	  provided	  help	  for	  sickly	  banks	  
and	  obliged	  the	  healthy	  ones	  to	  reimburse	  the	  government	  for	  the	  interventions.	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Because	  of	  this	  structure,	  the	  US	  government’s	  TARP	  investments	  made	  money	  for	  the	  
taxpayer,	  even	  though	  it	  developed	  a	  generous	  rescue	  plan.	  The	  government	  
implemented	  a	  systemic	  rescue	  package,	  including	  guarantees	  and	  Fed	  liquidity,	  which	  
supported	  the	  whole	  sector.	  According	  to	  some	  calculations,	  the	  interventions	  generated	  
a	  net	  benefit	  to	  the	  American	  economy	  of	  between	  $86	  and	  $109	  billion.37	  With	  its	  
payment	  structure	  –	  capital	  injections	  and	  warrants	  –	  the	  US	  government	  could	  recoup	  its	  
money.	  It	  allowed	  the	  government	  to	  internalize	  some	  of	  the	  positive	  external	  effect	  of	  its	  
rescue	  program.	  Getting	  the	  warrants	  in	  the	  nine	  major	  banks	  generated	  over	  $4	  billion,	  
and	  $3	  billion	  of	  that	  sum	  was	  paid	  by	  banks	  that	  did	  not	  need	  capital	  injections:	  Wells	  





Table	  2.	   Design	  Features	  of	  the	  American	  and	  British	  Bailout	  Plans	  






Design	   Required	  participation	  of	  major	  
banks	  
Voluntary	  
participation	  of	  major	  
banks	  
Effect	   All	  nine	  major	  banks	  participate	  
(incl.	  healthy	  banks	  Wells	  Fargo,	  JP	  
Morgan)	  
Self-­‐selection	  of	  sickest	  









Design	   Low,	  flat	  upfront	  fees	  paired	  with	  
long-­‐term	  warrants	  
Steep	  upfront	  fees	  
without	  warrants;	  risk-­‐
based	  fees	  for	  
guarantees	  
Effect	   Generous	  help	  for	  sick	  banks;	  tough	  
terms	  for	  healthy	  and	  lucky	  banks	  
High	  nominal	  charges	  




$8-­‐10bn	  gain	  from	  TARP's	  bank	  part	  
(excl.	  auto	  bailout	  &	  mortgage	  
relief)	  of	  which	  $4bn	  come	  from	  
sales	  of	  warrants	  from	  JP	  Morgan,	  
Wells	  Fargo	  and	  Goldman	  Sachs	  
£12bn	  ($14bn)	  currently	  
estimated	  losses;	  
current	  book	  loss	  of	  
£32bn	  ($51bn)	  from	  
RBS,	  Lloyds/HBOS	  	  
	  




Table	  2	  summarizes	  the	  differences	  in	  policy	  design	  between	  the	  two	  countries.	  It	  is	  
worth	  underlining	  that,	  despite	  these	  dissimilar	  policy	  designs,	  both	  governments	  have	  
publicly	  acknowledged	  that	  they	  had	  exactly	  the	  same	  objective:	  to	  prevent	  the	  implosion	  
of	  the	  banking	  system	  and	  to	  have	  all	  banks	  in	  the	  program.	  Alistair	  Darling,	  the	  British	  
Chancellor	  of	  the	  Exchequer,	  explained	  the	  goal	  of	  his	  government	  frankly:	  “The	  key	  was	  
to	  get	  capital	  into	  the	  banks	  that	  needed	  it	  –	  primarily	  RBS	  and	  HBOS,	  which	  was	  now	  
part	  of	  the	  Lloyd’s	  group	  –but	  at	  the	  same	  time	  to	  persuade	  a	  bank	  like	  HSBC,	  which	  had	  
no	  obvious	  need	  for	  more	  capital,	  to	  join	  the	  scheme.”39	  US	  Treasury	  Secretary	  Paulson	  
was	  similarly	  concerned	  with	  getting	  all	  large	  banks	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  plan,	  so	  as	  to	  
avoid	  the	  bailout	  as	  being	  stigmatizing.40	  
	  
	  
V.	  Bank	  Power:	  Structural	  or	  Instrumental?	  Automatic	  or	  Strategic?	  
Both	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  and	  the	  United	  States	  had	  banks	  that	  were	  too	  big	  to	  fail,	  and	  
there	  were	  recalcitrant	  healthy	  banks	  in	  both	  countries	  that	  preferred	  not	  to	  receive	  
equity	  injections	  from	  the	  state:	  Wells	  Fargo	  and	  JP	  Morgan	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  and	  
HSBC	  in	  the	  United	  Kingdom.	  Why	  were	  the	  British	  banks,	  and	  in	  particular	  HSBC,	  able	  
to	  keep	  policymakers	  from	  imposing	  their	  preferred	  solution,	  while	  the	  American	  banks	  
were	  not?	  In	  this	  section	  we	  show	  that	  their	  financial	  health	  was	  necessary	  to	  resist	  the	  
23	  
	  
government,	  but	  not	  sufficient	  to	  explain	  this	  outcome.	  Instead,	  we	  show	  that	  even	  
healthy	  banks	  will	  not	  defy	  their	  regulator,	  if	  a	  large	  proportion	  of	  their	  business	  lies	  
within	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  that	  regulator.	  Their	  structural	  dependence	  on	  the	  regulator	  is	  a	  
weakness,	  one	  that	  the	  state	  can	  exploit	  in	  negotiation	  with	  healthy	  banks.	  
	  
HSBC,	  JP	  Morgan,	  and	  Wells	  Fargo	  were	  all	  financially	  sound	  banks	  during	  the	  financial	  
crisis.	  Figure	  1	  displays	  HSBC’s	  monthly	  market	  capitalization	  relative	  to	  the	  British	  
banking	  sector	  for	  the	  thirty	  months	  from	  the	  beginning	  of	  2007.	  The	  crisis	  left	  the	  stocks	  
of	  most	  banks	  battered.	  Compared	  to	  the	  market	  capitalization	  in	  January	  2007,	  banks	  
had	  lost	  on	  average	  about	  45	  percent	  of	  their	  market	  value	  in	  October	  2008.	  HSBC	  saw	  its	  
capitalization	  drop	  by	  only	  14	  percent.	  HSBC	  profited	  from	  a	  broad	  deposit	  base,	  which	  






Note:	  Included	  are	  Alliance	  &	  Leicester,	  Barclays,	  Bradford	  &	  Bingley,	  HSBC,	  
Lloyds/HBOS,	  RBS	  and	  Standard	  Chartered.	  Source:	  Orbis	  –	  Bureau	  Van	  Dijk.	  
	  
  
Figure	  1.	  	   Monthly	  Market	  Capitalization	  of	  British	  Banks	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Wells	  Fargo	  and	  JP	  Morgan,	  like	  HSBC,	  were	  healthier	  than	  other	  big	  banks.	  Unlike	  most	  
of	  its	  peers,	  which	  got	  into	  trouble	  in	  the	  mortgage	  market,	  Wells	  Fargo	  had	  been	  strict	  in	  
its	  lending	  standards	  and	  had	  kept	  toxic	  housing	  assets	  of	  its	  balance	  sheet.	  Figure	  2	  
illustrates	  the	  capitalization	  of	  Wells	  Fargo	  in	  comparison	  to	  the	  major	  banks	  still	  in	  
business	  by	  the	  end	  of	  September.	  Wells	  Fargo’s	  market	  value	  was	  down	  only	  7	  percent	  
from	  its	  pre-­‐crisis	  level	  and	  JP	  Morgan	  was	  down	  13	  percent;	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  large	  banks	  
had	  dropped	  by	  47	  percent.	  	  







Note:	  Included	  are	  Bank	  of	  America,	  Citi	  Group,	  Goldman	  Sachs,	  JP	  Morgan	  Chase,	  
Merrill	  Lynch,	  NYB	  Mellon,	  State	  Street,	  and	  Wells	  Fargo.	  Source:	  Orbis	  –	  Bureau	  
Van	  Dijk.	  
	  
Figure	  2.	   Monthly	  Market	  Capitalization	  of	  Major	  US	  banks	  





There	  was	  no	  difference	  between	  the	  financial	  health	  of	  HSBC,	  JP	  Morgan	  and	  Wells	  
Fargo.	  All	  three	  banks	  had	  stable	  sources	  of	  liquidity.	  However,	  they	  drew	  on	  different	  
markets.	  In	  2005-­‐2007,	  HSBC	  generated	  only	  about	  20	  percent	  of	  its	  profits	  at	  home	  in	  
Britain,	  even	  though	  it	  was	  a	  dominant	  player	  in	  the	  concentrated	  British	  banking	  
market.	  Only	  the	  much	  smaller	  bank	  Standard	  Chartered	  makes	  a	  lower	  proportion	  of	  its	  
money	  from	  outside	  the	  UK	  (Figure	  3).	  Even	  though	  HSBC	  operates	  out	  of	  London,	  the	  
bank	  doesn’t	  depend	  on	  the	  British	  market.	  It	  makes	  more	  profit	  in	  Hong	  Kong	  than	  in	  







Note:	  Data	  refer	  to	  domestic	  revenue	  in	  2005-­‐2007;	  for	  Barclays,	  HBOS,	  HSBC	  and	  
Standard	  Chartered,	  they	  refer	  to	  domestic	  income.	  Source:	  Banks’	  annual	  reports.	  
	  
Figure	  3.	   UK	  Bank	  Revenues	  from	  the	  Domestic	  Market	  	  
	  








Note:	  Data	  refer	  to	  domestic	  revenue	  in	  2005-­‐2007.	  Source:	  Banks’	  annual	  reports.	  
	  
Figure	  4.	   US	  Bank	  Revenues	  from	  the	  Domestic	  Market	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In	  contrast,	  as	  Figure	  4	  illustrates,	  Wells	  Fargo	  operated	  solely	  in	  the	  American	  market.	  
Even	  after	  Wells	  Fargo	  acquired	  additional	  international	  business	  through	  the	  purchase	  
of	  Wachovia	  in	  2008,	  95	  percent	  of	  its	  loans	  were	  to	  American	  debtors.42	  JP	  Morgan’s	  
business	  looks	  similar	  in	  this	  respect,	  with	  75	  percent	  coming	  from	  the	  United	  States.	  
Figure	  3	  shows	  how	  much	  revenue	  these	  and	  other	  major	  banks	  make	  in	  their	  respective	  
domestic	  market,	  and	  highlights	  how	  –	  compared	  to	  HSBC	  –	  Wells	  Fargo	  and	  JP	  Morgan	  
depend	  more	  on	  their	  domestic	  market.	  	  
	  
This	  structural	  situation	  meant	  American	  regulators	  could	  make	  Wells	  Fargo	  and	  JP	  
Morgan	  an	  offer	  they	  could	  not	  refuse.	  In	  the	  decisive	  meeting	  between	  the	  CEOs	  of	  the	  
nine	  major	  banks	  and	  senior	  US	  government	  officials	  –	  Paulson,	  Bernanke,	  Tim	  Geithner	  
of	  the	  New	  York	  Fed,	  Sheila	  Bair	  of	  the	  FDIC,	  and	  Comptroller	  of	  the	  Currency	  John	  
Dugan	  –	  this	  regulatory	  threat	  was	  explicit,	  and	  it	  was	  repeated.	  In	  the	  talking	  points	  
prepared	  for	  the	  meeting	  on	  October	  13,	  2008,	  recalcitrant	  banks	  got	  this	  message:	  “If	  a	  
capital	  infusion	  is	  not	  appealing,	  you	  should	  be	  aware	  that	  your	  regulator	  will	  require	  it	  in	  
any	  circumstance.”43	  After	  Paulson’s	  presentation	  of	  the	  plan,	  which	  reiterated	  the	  
unpleasant	  consequences	  of	  not	  accepting	  the	  aid,	  the	  CEO	  of	  Wells	  Fargo	  complained	  to	  
the	  other	  CEOs	  “why	  am	  I	  in	  this	  room,	  talking	  about	  bailing	  you	  out?”	  	  Paulson’s	  
response	  was	  a	  threat	  of	  regulatory	  consequences:	  “Your	  regulator	  is	  sitting	  right	  there	  
[pointing	  to	  the	  head	  of	  the	  FDIC	  and	  the	  comptroller	  of	  the	  currency].	  And	  you’re	  going	  
to	  get	  a	  call	  tomorrow	  telling	  you	  you’re	  undercapitalized	  and	  that	  you	  won’t	  be	  able	  to	  
raise	  money	  in	  the	  private	  markets.”44	  This	  is	  an	  explicit	  threat	  from	  a	  regulator	  against	  a	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financially	  healthy	  bank.	  The	  regulator	  could	  make	  trouble	  for	  the	  bank	  in	  unsettled	  
markets	  –	  the	  regulator	  knew	  it,	  and	  the	  bank’s	  CEO	  knew	  it.	  
	  
In	  contrast,	  UK	  officials	  could	  not	  make	  this	  threat.	  The	  UK	  government	  wanted	  to	  
include	  HSBC	  in	  the	  recapitalization	  plan,	  but	  HSBC	  refused.	  Multiple	  figures	  associated	  
with	  the	  bailout	  repeated	  that	  the	  UK	  government	  had	  no	  tools	  to	  force	  HSBC	  to	  take	  
state	  capital,	  even	  though	  it	  was	  the	  government’s	  first	  preference.	  A	  senior	  government	  
minister	  said,	  “the	  British	  government	  does	  not	  have	  the	  power	  simply	  to	  acquire	  capital	  
in	  somebody	  else’s	  bank….	  You	  can’t	  insist,	  on	  an	  innocent	  third	  party,	  where	  [the	  state]	  
is	  going	  to	  take	  a	  great	  wadge	  of	  your	  bank	  off	  you.”	  Another	  senior	  UK	  government	  
advisor	  said	  the	  same	  thing.	  “We	  couldn’t	  force	  HSBC….	  They	  made	  clear	  that	  we	  had	  no	  
power,	  and	  if	  we	  tried	  it	  they	  would	  take	  us	  to	  court.”	  The	  United	  States	  has	  a	  court	  
system	  too,	  and	  banks	  have	  never	  been	  averse	  to	  using	  it	  to	  protect	  their	  interests.	  Banks	  
can	  only	  fight	  the	  government,	  however,	  when	  they	  do	  not	  view	  a	  hostile	  relationship	  
with	  bank	  regulators	  as	  too	  costly.	  HSBC’s	  threat	  to	  take	  the	  government	  to	  court	  was	  the	  
sort	  of	  threat	  that	  only	  a	  bank	  unconcerned	  with	  its	  future	  relationship	  with	  national	  
regulators	  could	  afford	  to	  make.	  
	  
HSBC’s	  refusal	  was	  a	  deliberate	  act.	  British	  policymakers	  had	  not	  foreseen	  these	  
objections	  and	  automatically	  designed	  a	  recapitalization	  that	  excluded	  HSBC,	  which	  is	  
how	  automatic	  structural	  power	  would	  work.	  Yet	  neither	  was	  HSBC’s	  calculated	  move	  
dependent	  on	  lobbying	  or	  influence	  bought	  with	  the	  executive.	  As	  the	  phone	  logs	  and	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memoirs	  of	  Hank	  Paulson	  and	  Alistair	  Darling	  made	  clear,	  US	  banks	  had	  much	  more	  
frequent	  access	  to	  the	  top	  of	  the	  Treasury	  than	  did	  UK	  banks.45	  The	  conventional	  story,	  
according	  to	  which	  large	  American	  banks	  have	  developed	  strong	  instrumental	  lobbying	  
ties	  to	  officials,	  is	  borne	  out	  in	  our	  research.	  Moreover,	  though	  we	  cannot	  with	  any	  
reliability	  observe	  automatic	  instrumental	  power,	  the	  US	  Treasury	  Secretary	  was	  a	  peer	  of	  
the	  CEOs	  of	  the	  large	  American	  banks,	  as	  his	  former	  job	  was	  CEO	  of	  Goldman	  Sachs.	  US	  
banks	  had	  substantial	  instrumental	  power.	  But	  they	  lacked	  structural	  power	  that	  would	  
have	  given	  them	  the	  credibility	  to	  stand	  up	  to	  Paulson’s	  regulatory	  threat.	  	  
	  
HSBC’s	  action	  was	  intentional,	  but	  it	  was	  a	  product	  of	  its	  structural	  position	  in	  the	  
market,	  not	  the	  result	  of	  its	  lobbying	  access.	  HSBC	  made	  clear	  to	  the	  UK	  government	  that	  
it	  neither	  wanted	  nor	  needed	  state	  recapitalization,	  and	  that	  it	  would	  sue	  the	  government	  
if	  challenged.	  The	  bank	  then	  reinforced	  that	  case	  by	  refusing	  to	  cooperate	  with	  the	  
government.	  The	  former	  Deputy	  Governor	  Sir	  John	  Gieve	  of	  the	  Bank	  of	  England	  
characterized	  their	  response	  to	  the	  government	  this	  way:	  “HSBC	  said	  effectively:	  ‘We've	  
got	  no	  problem	  in	  financing	  our	  business.	  We've	  got	  this	  massive	  deposit	  collection	  
business	  in	  the	  Far	  East;	  we	  may	  have	  made	  massive	  losses	  in	  the	  US…	  but	  actually	  we	  are	  
perfectly	  solvent;	  the	  world	  believes	  we're	  solvent;	  we	  don't	  need	  any	  money.’	  They	  also	  
resisted	  the	  implication	  that	  the	  whole	  their	  whole	  group	  was	  dependent	  on	  the	  UK	  
authorities	  and	  made	  a	  point	  of	  sending	  their	  UK	  man,	  …	  not	  their	  chief	  executive	  or	  
chairman	  -­‐	  to	  meetings	  with	  the	  Chancellor.”46	  This	  behavior	  contrasts	  with	  the	  alacrity	  
with	  which	  the	  CEOs	  of	  the	  nine	  largest	  American	  banks	  showed	  up	  for	  the	  October	  13	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meeting	  when	  Paulson	  summoned	  them	  only	  the	  Sunday	  night	  before	  the	  Monday	  
meeting.	  	  
	  
HSBC	  was	  not	  the	  only	  large	  bank	  to	  avoid	  state	  capitalizations.	  Barclays	  raised	  private	  
capital	  from	  Qatar	  and	  Abu	  Dhabi.	  Unlike	  HSBC,	  Barclays	  relied	  substantially	  on	  the	  
British	  domestic	  market	  (see	  Figure	  3).	  The	  actions	  of	  Barclays	  do	  not	  contradict	  our	  
argument,	  as	  can	  be	  observed	  from	  the	  sequence	  of	  its	  actions.	  Barclays	  was	  financially	  
weak	  and	  therefore	  lacked	  the	  capacity	  to	  block	  a	  government	  plan	  for	  mandatory	  
recapitalizations	  (see	  Figure	  1).	  Barclays	  never	  wanted	  state	  capital,	  but	  when	  the	  
government	  negotiated	  the	  plan,	  it	  was	  unsure	  it	  could	  raise	  capital	  privately.	  Once	  HSBC	  
quickly	  announced	  it	  would	  not	  take	  state	  capital,47	  Barclays	  made	  clear	  it	  would	  go	  to	  
extraordinary	  lengths	  to	  refinance	  itself	  through	  its	  shareholders	  rather	  than	  taking	  state	  
money.48	  Barclays	  kept	  the	  option	  of	  state	  capital	  open	  until,	  a	  few	  days	  later,	  it	  
succeeded	  in	  raising	  the	  required	  capital.	  By	  then,	  the	  government	  had	  announced	  its	  
debt	  guarantee	  programs,	  which	  eased	  funding	  for	  Barclays	  and	  helped	  the	  bank	  to	  
convince	  investors	  to	  provide	  capital.	  Reflecting	  on	  Barclays’	  negotiation,	  John	  Gieve	  from	  
the	  Bank	  of	  England	  said:	  “[Barclays]	  played	  us	  very	  cleverly,	  in	  that	  they	  managed	  to	  
negotiate	  a	  sum	  of	  capital,	  which	  they	  had	  to	  raise	  and	  that	  they	  could	  raise	  –	  from	  their	  
friends	  in	  Singapore	  and	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  so	  on.	  And	  thereby	  pass	  our	  test,	  while	  still	  
getting	  the	  benefit	  of	  the	  overall	  government	  guarantee.”	  Barclays	  avoided	  state	  





The	  case	  of	  Barclays	  is	  also	  instructive	  on	  the	  role	  of	  the	  government’s	  pricing	  of	  state	  
capital.	  The	  steep	  nominal	  pricing	  of	  12	  percent	  by	  the	  British	  government	  may	  give	  rise	  
to	  the	  objection	  that	  rejection	  of	  the	  deal	  by	  healthy	  British	  banks	  was	  endogenous.	  That	  
is,	  British	  banks	  may	  have	  only	  refused	  to	  cooperate	  because	  the	  government	  –	  
mistakenly	  –	  demanded	  too	  high	  a	  price.	  Had	  Darling	  asked	  for	  a	  coupon	  of	  only	  5	  
percent	  as	  did	  Paulson,	  would	  the	  British	  banks	  have	  participated	  in	  the	  program?	  The	  
available	  evidence	  suggests	  not.	  First,	  the	  banks	  as	  well	  as	  the	  government	  found	  pricing	  
to	  be	  a	  secondary	  issue.	  Barclays	  eschewed	  state	  capital	  but	  accepted	  even	  costlier	  private	  
capital.	  Barclays	  sold	  its	  shares	  at	  a	  higher	  discount	  than	  the	  government	  had	  demanded	  
and	  gave	  additional	  warrants	  to	  its	  investors.49	  On	  the	  other	  side	  of	  the	  negotiation	  table,	  
pricing	  seemed	  not	  to	  be	  the	  top	  issue	  for	  policymakers	  either.	  For	  Darling	  it	  was	  
important	  to	  implement	  a	  recapitalization	  program,	  not	  how	  much	  banks	  would	  have	  to	  
pay.50	  Second,	  the	  nominal	  pricing	  of	  coupons	  differed,	  but	  the	  overall	  pricing	  of	  capital	  
for	  healthy	  banks	  was	  actually	  similar.	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  British	  plan,	  the	  American	  plan	  
included	  warrants.	  These	  increased	  the	  costs	  of	  state	  capital,	  especially	  for	  the	  healthier	  
banks	  that	  would	  recover	  quickly	  from	  the	  crisis.	  For	  this	  reason,	  the	  pricing	  was	  
comparable	  and	  the	  rescue	  plans	  did	  not	  give	  HSBC	  any	  stronger	  reason	  to	  resist	  the	  
program	  than	  JP	  Morgan	  or	  Wells	  Fargo.	  	  	  
	  
This	  examination	  of	  policymaking	  during	  the	  crisis	  of	  2008	  demonstrates	  that	  strategic	  
instrumental	  power	  cannot	  explain	  the	  variation	  in	  policy	  design	  between	  the	  United	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States	  and	  the	  United	  Kingdom.	  Instead	  the	  different	  policies	  resulted	  from	  the	  outside	  
option	  open	  to	  HSBC,	  in	  its	  negotiations	  with	  its	  regulators,	  because	  of	  its	  structural	  
position	  as	  a	  global	  bank	  with	  a	  deep	  deposit	  base	  in	  external	  markets.	  This	  is	  an	  exercise	  
of	  what	  we	  have	  called	  strategic	  structural	  power.	  However,	  we	  also	  want	  to	  consider	  the	  
possibility	  that	  the	  difference	  in	  bailout	  policies	  might	  have	  been	  a	  product	  of	  lobbying	  
during	  a	  prior	  time	  period.	  That	  is,	  that	  the	  policy	  adopted	  at	  time	  t	  was	  only	  possible	  
because	  of	  the	  exercise	  of	  strategic	  instrumental	  power	  at	  time	  t-­‐1.51	  	  
	  
It	  would	  be	  foolish	  to	  deny	  the	  abundant	  evidence	  that	  American	  and	  British	  banks	  used	  
their	  growing	  economic	  resources	  to	  advocate	  politically	  for	  financial	  deregulation	  –	  and	  
that	  this	  financial	  deregulation	  played	  some	  role	  in	  creating	  banks	  that	  were	  “too	  big	  to	  
fail.”52	  	  However,	  this	  general	  finding	  holds	  for	  both	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  and	  the	  United	  
States.	  And	  of	  the	  two,	  the	  US	  is	  widely	  regarded	  as	  the	  more	  captured	  system	  with	  
respect	  to	  financial	  regulation.53	  An	  alternative	  hypothesis	  based	  on	  the	  exercise	  of	  
strategic	  instrumental	  power	  at	  time	  t-­‐1	  to	  account	  for	  the	  variation	  we	  observe	  at	  time	  t	  
would	  have	  to	  show	  how	  past	  lobbying	  in	  Britain	  allowed	  HSBC	  to	  frustrate	  government	  
attempts	  to	  adopt	  forced	  recapitalizations,	  while	  foreclosing	  that	  possibility	  to	  American	  
banks.	  We	  can	  think	  of	  no	  such	  plausible	  account.	  A	  lobbying	  account	  for	  an	  outcome	  in	  
which	  US	  healthy	  banks	  do	  worse	  than	  UK	  healthy	  banks	  is	  difficult	  to	  square	  with	  the	  
strong	  evidence	  that	  the	  instrumental	  power	  of	  US	  financial	  institutions	  has	  exceeded	  




There	  is	  a	  “revolving	  door”	  alternative	  hypothesis	  that	  we	  should	  also	  consider.	  The	  fluid	  
labor	  market	  between	  regulators	  in	  Washington	  and	  banks	  in	  Wall	  Street	  might	  have	  
given	  US	  policymakers	  greater	  expertise	  about	  the	  sector,	  and	  thus	  accounted	  for	  their	  
ability	  to	  adopt	  their	  preferred	  policy.	  The	  British	  civil	  service	  prioritizes	  the	  recruitment	  
of	  generalists	  rather	  than	  specialists	  with	  either	  PhDs	  in	  economics	  or	  private	  experience	  
in	  finance.54	  This	  could	  handicap	  the	  government	  in	  bargaining	  with	  banks.	  British	  banks,	  
in	  this	  account,	  would	  be	  able	  to	  play	  on	  their	  expertise	  to	  drive	  a	  better	  deal	  from	  
Treasury	  mandarins	  with	  limited	  experience	  of	  the	  actual	  functioning	  of	  banking	  than	  in	  
the	  United	  States.	  Indeed,	  this	  lack	  of	  experience	  in	  finance	  was	  reinforced	  in	  the	  political	  
sphere,	  where	  Hank	  Paulson,	  the	  ex-­‐CEO	  of	  Goldman	  Sachs,	  clearly	  had	  a	  large	  
informational	  advantage	  over	  his	  counterpart	  in	  the	  United	  Kingdom.	  
	  
The	  UK	  Treasury	  assuredly	  lacked	  some	  of	  the	  bank-­‐specific	  expertise	  enjoyed	  by	  the	  US	  
Treasury.	  However,	  the	  Labour	  government	  recognized	  this	  shortcoming	  and	  elevated	  
Paul	  Myners,	  a	  finance	  veteran,	  to	  the	  House	  of	  Lords	  so	  that	  he	  could	  be	  appointed	  
Financial	  Services	  Secretary.	  It	  was	  his	  job	  to	  negotiate	  directly	  with	  the	  banks.	  Alistair	  
Darling	  noted	  that	  Myners’	  “expertise	  and	  experience	  were	  invaluable.”55	  Prime	  Minister	  
Gordon	  Brown	  relied	  heavily	  on	  Shriti	  Vadera,	  a	  former	  investment	  banker	  at	  UBS	  
Warburg.	  The	  government	  also	  brought	  private	  sector	  consultants	  into	  its	  negotiating	  
team	  when	  devising	  policy.	  One	  of	  them	  told	  us	  in	  an	  interview	  that	  Vadera’s	  economic	  
and	  political	  expertise	  was	  instrumental	  in	  helping	  the	  government	  get	  the	  size	  of	  the	  
bailout	  right	  so	  as	  to	  satisfy	  both	  political	  and	  economic	  constraints:	  “this	  is	  why	  we	  were	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lucky	  we	  had	  Shriti	  Vadera,	  because	  we	  had	  someone	  who	  was	  able	  to	  have	  the	  credibility	  
to	  say,	  ‘This	  is	  the	  number.’	  And	  people	  rallied	  behind	  it.”	  We	  find	  no	  evidence	  that	  a	  lack	  




VI.	  Comparative	  Evidence	  beyond	  the	  UK	  and	  the	  US	  
Theories	  based	  on	  the	  use	  of	  instrumental	  power	  fare	  poorly	  in	  explaining	  the	  variation	  
between	  the	  American	  and	  British	  policies,	  either	  at	  the	  time	  or	  bailout	  or	  as	  a	  prior	  cause	  
that	  allowed	  the	  bailouts	  to	  take	  the	  form	  they	  did.	  We	  have	  shown	  that	  an	  account	  
centered	  on	  the	  structural	  power	  exercised	  by	  HSBC	  provides	  the	  best	  explanation	  of	  
these	  outcomes.	  In	  this	  section	  we	  consider	  comparative	  evidence	  from	  France	  and	  
Germany,	  to	  see	  if	  the	  same	  dynamic	  holds	  in	  other	  cases.	  	  
	  
In	  addition	  to	  expanding	  our	  number	  of	  observations,	  France	  and	  Germany	  provide	  useful	  
empirical	  leverage	  on	  bank	  bailouts,	  because	  their	  inclusion	  allows	  us	  to	  consider	  two	  
additional	  alternative	  hypotheses.	  The	  first	  is	  the	  economic	  concentration	  of	  the	  banking	  
sector.	  A	  smaller	  number	  of	  banks	  (as	  in	  the	  concentrated	  UK	  sector)	  might	  coordinate	  
more	  easily	  to	  resist	  state	  pressure	  than	  a	  larger	  number	  of	  banks	  (as	  involved	  in	  the	  US	  
case).	  France	  has	  a	  highly	  concentrated	  bank	  sector,	  like	  the	  UK,	  with	  six	  banks	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accounting	  for	  80	  percent	  of	  bank	  lending.	  Germany	  has	  a	  less	  concentrated	  and	  more	  
heterogeneous	  banking	  sector	  that	  includes	  private	  banks,	  cooperative	  banks,	  and	  public	  
savings	  banks,	  much	  like	  the	  American	  banking	  sector.	  If	  banking	  concentration	  were	  
important,	  we	  would	  expect	  to	  observe	  similar	  outcomes	  in	  the	  French	  and	  British	  cases	  
and	  in	  the	  American	  and	  German	  cases.	  
	  
We	  are	  also	  interested	  in	  considering	  another	  alternative	  hypothesis:	  the	  government	  of	  a	  
medium-­‐sized	  economy	  might	  face	  harder	  spending	  constraints	  than	  its	  counterpart	  in	  a	  
large	  economy.	  The	  United	  States	  and	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  have	  independent	  central	  
banks,	  and	  they	  can	  both	  print	  their	  own	  money.	  Interview	  subjects	  in	  Britain	  told	  us	  they	  
were	  aware	  that	  they	  could	  create	  the	  money	  to	  fund	  a	  big	  bailout	  if	  they	  had	  to.	  But	  what	  
if	  there	  is	  a	  logic	  under	  which	  the	  United	  Kingdom,	  a	  medium-­‐sized	  economy,	  felt	  more	  
pressure	  to	  keep	  the	  bailout	  small	  –	  so	  as	  to	  avoid	  being	  labeled	  a	  sovereign	  debt	  risk	  by	  
international	  bond	  markets?	  We	  cannot	  test	  this	  hypothesis	  directly,	  but	  we	  can	  compare	  
the	  dynamics	  of	  bank-­‐state	  interaction	  in	  the	  UK	  with	  that	  in	  two	  other	  European	  states	  
of	  similar	  size:	  France	  and	  Germany.	  These	  two	  latter	  countries,	  as	  part	  of	  the	  Eurozone,	  
lack	  the	  capacity	  to	  print	  their	  own	  money,	  and	  so	  should	  theoretically	  be	  more	  
constrained	  than	  Britain.	  The	  data	  in	  Figure	  5	  suggest	  that	  whatever	  motivated	  British	  
bailout	  policy,	  it	  was	  not	  fiscal	  restraint:	  the	  UK	  spent	  far	  more	  on	  the	  bailouts,	  as	  a	  
proportion	  of	  GDP,	  than	  did	  governments	  in	  the	  similarly	  sized	  French	  and	  German	  









Note:	  Following	  the	  accounting	  methodology	  of	  the	  European	  Commission,	  total	  
banking	  support	  is	  weighted	  by	  the	  use	  of	  different	  instruments,	  15	  percent	  for	  credit	  
guarantees,	  70	  percent	  for	  asset	  relief	  and	  100	  percent	  for	  recapitalizations	  (for	  both	  
schemes	  and	  ad	  hoc	  measures).56	  
	  
Figure	  5.	   Banking	  Support	  across	  Countries	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France	  and	  Germany	  shared	  a	  similar	  crisis	  experience	  as	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  and	  the	  
United	  States.	  The	  Lehman	  collapse	  affected	  the	  whole	  banking	  sector,	  and	  governments	  
responded	  with	  big	  rescue	  packages	  in	  early	  October	  2008.	  The	  French	  government	  
injected	  capital	  in	  all	  major	  banks	  and	  avoided	  a	  loss	  of	  taxpayer	  money,	  as	  in	  the	  
American	  case.	  The	  German	  government	  supported	  the	  banks	  with	  a	  voluntary	  program,	  
which	  funneled	  state	  capital	  to	  the	  few	  worst-­‐off	  banks,	  and	  much	  like	  the	  British	  bailout,	  
this	  plan	  generated	  large	  losses	  for	  the	  state.	  Neither	  the	  size	  of	  the	  economy	  nor	  the	  
concentration	  of	  the	  banking	  sector	  can	  explain	  this	  difference.	  These	  economies	  are	  
similar:	  the	  two	  banking	  sectors	  are	  of	  equal	  size,	  and	  they	  contribute	  to	  the	  same	  degree	  
to	  the	  economy	  (financial	  service	  value	  added	  is	  31	  percent	  in	  Germany,	  34	  percent	  in	  
France).	  Instead,	  the	  differential	  dependence	  of	  banks	  on	  the	  state	  explains	  the	  
difference.	  	  
	  
In	  Germany,	  industry-­‐wide	  recapitalizations	  ran	  into	  the	  resistance	  of	  Deutsche	  Bank.	  
Deutsche	  is	  Germany’s	  biggest	  bank	  and,	  it	  has	  moved	  away	  from	  only	  supporting	  
German	  business,	  branching	  out	  internationally.	  In	  2007,	  it	  generated	  only	  27	  percent	  of	  
its	  income	  in	  Germany.	  Its	  financial	  health	  and	  the	  implicit	  threat	  to	  leave	  killed	  the	  
possibility	  of	  an	  industry-­‐wide	  initiative.	  Like	  his	  counterpart	  at	  HSBC,	  Deutsche	  Bank	  
CEO	  Josef	  Ackermann	  publicly	  torpedoed	  a	  collective	  solution	  by	  excluding	  Deutsche	  
Bank	  from	  it,	  saying	  he	  would	  feel	  ashamed	  if	  Deutsche	  had	  to	  admit	  it	  needed	  money	  
from	  the	  taxpayer.57	  Since	  accepting	  state	  capital	  meant	  admitting	  failure	  and	  entailed	  a	  
number	  of	  restrictions,	  only	  the	  weakest	  banks	  participated	  in	  the	  program,	  namely	  Hypo	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Real	  Estate,	  West	  LB	  and	  Commerzbank.	  And	  the	  interventions	  in	  those	  banks	  left	  the	  
Germany	  taxpayers	  with	  large	  losses.	  
	  
The	  French	  government	  faced	  no	  resistance	  from	  a	  large,	  international	  bank.	  The	  major	  
French	  banks	  are	  solidly	  based	  in	  the	  French	  market.	  The	  strongest	  opposition	  came	  from	  
a	  healthy	  bank,	  Crédit	  Mutuel,	  which	  did	  not	  need	  the	  extra	  capital.	  But	  Crédit	  Mutuel	  is	  
decidedly	  a	  domestic	  bank:	  94	  percent	  its	  income	  comes	  from	  France.	  Crédit	  Mutuel	  
found	  itself	  in	  exactly	  the	  same	  position	  as	  Wells	  Fargo	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  as	  
summarized	  in	  an	  interview	  reported	  by	  Cornelia	  Woll:	  “The	  four	  banks	  had	  roughly	  the	  
same	  interest,	  the	  four	  biggest	  in	  fact.	  And	  the	  fifth,	  which	  was	  also	  the	  smallest,	  was	  
really	  in	  perfect	  health,	  but	  it	  got	  its	  arm	  twisted.”58	  The	  French	  government	  brought	  the	  
banks	  together	  to	  establish	  the	  SFEF,	  a	  common	  fund	  for	  liquidity	  support,	  and	  all	  six	  
major	  banks	  accepted	  state	  capital.	  This	  plan	  stabilized	  the	  banking	  sector	  and	  created	  a	  
small	  profit	  for	  the	  French	  government.	  	  
	  
There	  is	  no	  doubt	  that	  banks	  in	  France	  enjoy	  a	  close	  relationship	  with	  the	  state.	  Indeed,	  
even	  more	  than	  the	  United	  States,	  scholars	  of	  French	  finance	  argue	  that	  the	  automatic	  
instrumental	  power	  of	  French	  banks	  –	  the	  identity	  of	  interests	  between	  bank	  CEOs	  and	  
the	  senior	  policymakers	  –	  is	  uniquely	  high.	  In	  the	  words	  of	  Jabko	  and	  Massoc,	  59	  	  
What	  sets	  France	  apart	  [from	  the	  US	  and	  UK]	  is	  that	  this	  privileged	  access	  rests	  on	  
a	  sociologically	  stable	  and	  homogeneous	  elite	  of	  public	  and	  private	  actors.	  The	  
social	  circles	  and	  career	  trajectories	  of	  private	  bankers	  and	  high-­‐ranking	  state	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officials	  do	  not	  just	  intersect	  on	  occasion,	  but	  are	  almost	  indistinguishable	  from	  
each	  other.	  
These	  bankers	  were	  intimately	  involved	  with	  the	  drafting	  of	  the	  legislation	  bailing	  out	  
French	  banks.	  But	  because	  the	  only	  healthy	  bank,	  Crédit	  Mutuel,	  was	  dependent	  on	  the	  
domestic	  market,	  it	  did	  not	  have	  the	  structural	  power	  of	  HSBC	  in	  the	  UK	  to	  exclude	  itself	  
from	  the	  collective	  French	  solution.	  
	  
German	  banks	  have	  substantial	  instrumental	  influence	  on	  the	  German	  government.	  But	  
the	  instrumental	  power	  of	  German	  banks	  is	  weaker	  than	  those	  of	  banks	  in	  France	  or	  in	  
the	  United	  States:	  there	  is	  not	  the	  same	  uniformity	  of	  educational	  background	  that	  unites	  
banks	  and	  the	  state	  in	  France,	  nor	  do	  German	  banks	  have	  preferential	  access	  to	  
government	  officials	  provided	  by	  campaign	  contributions,	  as	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  
Lobbying	  organizations	  of	  German	  banks	  follow	  the	  banking	  sector’s	  division	  of	  
cooperative,	  savings	  and	  commercial	  banks.	  And	  the	  association	  of	  German	  commercial	  
banks	  often	  struggles	  over	  internal	  tensions.60	  The	  empirical	  record	  of	  the	  German	  
bailout	  policy	  shows	  that	  banks	  were	  divided,	  and	  in	  the	  face	  of	  these	  divisions	  the	  
German	  government	  eventually	  developed	  a	  bank	  support	  program	  without	  much	  input	  
from	  the	  banks.61	  Thus,	  in	  comparative	  terms,	  we	  classify	  the	  use	  of	  strategic	  instrumental	  
power	  by	  German	  banks	  as	  lower	  than	  in	  the	  other	  three	  cases.	  It	  would	  contradict	  the	  
available	  evidence	  to	  say	  that	  the	  strong	  lobbying	  capacity	  of	  German	  banks	  accounted	  




Table	  3.	  	   Bank	  Power	  and	  Taxpayer	  Profits	  
	   Strategic	  Structural	  
Power	  Large	  Banks	  
Strategic	  Instrumental	  





US	   Low	  (JP	  Morgan,	  Wells	  
Fargo)	  
High	   Yes	   $8-­‐10	  billion	  
France	   Low	  (BNP	  Paribas,	  Crédit	  
Mutuel)	  
High	   Yes	   $1	  billion	  
UK	   High	  (HSBC)	   High	   No	   -­‐$14	  billion	  
Germany	   High	  (Deutsche	  Bank)	   Medium	   No	   -­‐$55	  billion	  
	  	  
Note:	  Classification	  of	  structural	  power	  of	  healthy	  large	  banks	  based	  on	  share	  of	  income	  from	  domestic	  
business:	  JP	  Morgan	  (75%),	  Wells	  Fargo	  (100%),	  BNP	  Paribas	  (47%),	  Deutsche	  Bank	  (27%),	  HSBC	  (22%).	  
Income	  shares	  taken	  from	  banks’	  annual	  reports;	  taxpayer	  profit	  taken	  from	  CBO,	  May	  201362	  and	  Eurostat,	  
Supplementary	  table	  for	  the	  financial	  crisis,	  October	  2013.	  The	  Eurostat	  figures	  denote	  the	  accumulated	  
profit	  to	  the	  general	  government	  from	  2007-­‐2012	  and	  represent	  a	  preliminary	  estimate	  of	  the	  total	  costs,	  
which	  ultimately	  depend	  on	  the	  final	  selling	  price	  of	  assets.	  The	  US	  CBO	  figures	  include	  the	  outcome	  for	  
the	  overall	  financial	  intervention	  of	  the	  TARP,	  excluding	  the	  auto	  industry	  bailout	  and	  mortgage	  relief.	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Table	  3	  arrays	  the	  outcomes	  observed	  across	  the	  four	  cases.	  In	  all	  four	  countries	  the	  fall	  of	  
Lehman	  Brothers	  led	  to	  substantial	  contact	  between	  senior	  bankers	  and	  senior	  
policymakers.	  The	  German	  banking	  sector	  had	  the	  most	  heterogeneous	  interests,	  which	  
compromised	  its	  lobbying	  capacity,	  so	  we	  classify	  it	  has	  having	  medium	  instrumental	  
power.	  As	  is	  clear	  from	  the	  table,	  though,	  instrumental	  power	  is	  irrelevant	  to	  the	  
outcomes	  observed.	  Where	  large	  banks	  exercised	  strategic	  structural	  power	  in	  
negotiations	  with	  the	  government	  –	  because	  most	  of	  their	  revenue	  came	  from	  other	  
jurisdictions	  –	  those	  banks	  were	  able	  to	  prevent	  governments	  from	  imposing	  an	  industry-­‐
wide	  solution.	  That	  HSBC	  and	  Deutsche	  Bank	  were	  able	  to	  overpower	  their	  respective	  
governments	  was	  costly	  to	  British	  and	  German	  taxpayers,	  as	  the	  final	  column	  of	  Table	  3	  
makes	  clear.	  In	  all	  four	  cases	  large	  banks	  were	  bailed	  out.	  This	  is	  an	  indicator	  of	  the	  
central	  place	  that	  finance	  occupies	  in	  these	  economies.	  But	  our	  interest	  as	  social	  scientists	  
lies	  in	  explaining	  consequential	  variations	  in	  policy	  design	  across	  countries.	  To	  do	  so	  
requires	  putting	  analytical	  attention	  on	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  structural	  power	  of	  banks	  




Large	  banks	  are	  central	  to	  the	  functioning	  of	  financial	  systems,	  and	  when	  their	  failure	  
risks	  bringing	  down	  the	  entire	  financial	  edifice,	  the	  structural	  position	  of	  these	  banks	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makes	  a	  bailout	  the	  most	  likely	  outcome.	  That	  is	  a	  feature	  of	  capitalism	  generally,	  not	  just	  
American	  capitalism.	  We	  observe	  these	  bailouts	  in	  countries	  across	  the	  industrialized	  
world.	  Our	  analysis	  of	  bailouts	  in	  four	  of	  the	  world’s	  six	  largest	  economies	  demonstrates	  
that	  the	  strategic	  exercise	  of	  structural	  power	  was	  a	  root	  cause	  of	  variation	  in	  the	  form	  of	  
the	  bailouts	  chosen.	  After	  the	  fall	  of	  Lehman	  Brothers,	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  and	  
Germany,	  like	  the	  United	  States	  and	  France,	  had	  to	  prevent	  their	  vulnerable	  banks	  from	  
imploding.	  Yet	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  and	  Germany	  failed	  to	  force	  their	  preferred	  terms	  on	  
the	  largest	  banks,	  because	  HSBC	  and	  Deutsche	  Bank	  were	  insufficiently	  dependent	  on	  
domestic	  markets.	  Neither	  British	  nor	  German	  policymakers	  could	  pursue	  their	  optimal	  
policy.	  Governments	  in	  the	  United	  States	  and	  France	  were	  in	  a	  stronger	  structural	  
position,	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  their	  large	  banks,	  than	  were	  governments	  in	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  and	  
Germany.	  American	  and	  French	  governments	  got	  a	  better	  policy	  deal	  from	  their	  large	  
banks,	  in	  that	  they	  were	  able	  to	  capture	  more	  of	  the	  upside	  of	  healthy	  banks	  for	  
taxpayers.	  	  
	  
Our	  analysis	  runs	  counter	  to	  virtually	  all	  accounts	  of	  the	  American	  political	  economy,	  
post-­‐crisis.	  There	  are	  two	  reasons	  this	  literature	  has	  provided	  an	  incomplete	  account	  of	  
the	  role	  of	  bank	  power	  in	  explaining	  bailout	  policies.	  First,	  most	  analysis	  of	  the	  American	  
political	  economy	  does	  not	  situate	  the	  US	  case	  in	  a	  comparative	  framework.	  Without	  
embedding	  arguments	  about	  political	  power	  of	  capitalists	  in	  the	  United	  States	  in	  a	  
comparative	  analysis	  of	  the	  political	  power	  of	  capitalists	  in	  democratic	  capitalism,	  it	  is	  
impossible	  to	  sort	  out	  the	  effects	  of	  capitalism,	  in	  which	  bankers	  are	  almost	  always	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privileged,	  from	  those	  of	  the	  specific	  privileges	  afforded	  to	  bankers	  in	  the	  US	  political	  
economy.	  	  
	  
Secondly,	  existing	  work	  has	  focused	  almost	  entirely	  on	  the	  way	  in	  which	  American	  
financiers	  ‘buy’	  influence	  –	  or	  in	  other	  words,	  on	  the	  strategic	  exercise	  of	  instrumental	  
power.63	  We	  have	  shown	  that	  structural	  power	  can	  fruitfully	  be	  reincorporated	  into	  
political	  analysis	  not	  only	  as	  a	  resource	  that	  acts	  automatically	  in	  the	  heads	  of	  politicians,	  
but	  also	  as	  a	  resource	  on	  which	  banks	  draw	  deliberately	  in	  bargaining	  with	  governments.	  
It	  is	  different	  from	  lobbying	  power.	  Lobbying	  power	  is	  about	  the	  access	  of	  banks	  to	  
policymakers	  and	  the	  expertise	  their	  lobbying	  apparatus	  can	  mobilize.	  These	  features	  
were	  irrelevant	  to	  the	  course	  of	  the	  bailouts	  in	  these	  four	  cases.	  Moreover,	  the	  ability	  to	  
defy	  regulators,	  which	  was	  crucial	  to	  the	  strategy	  pursued	  by	  HSBC	  but	  foreclosed	  to	  JP	  
Morgan	  and	  Wells	  Fargo,	  was	  a	  product	  of	  their	  strategic	  structural	  power.	  That	  is,	  of	  
their	  deliberate	  use	  of	  their	  role	  in	  the	  economy	  as	  a	  resource	  in	  bargaining	  with	  the	  
government.	  	  
	  
Our	  theoretical	  innovation	  in	  this	  article	  is	  to	  reanimate	  the	  study	  of	  structural	  power	  by	  
showing	  how	  it	  can	  be	  used	  as	  a	  strategic	  resource	  of	  business,	  not	  merely	  as	  an	  
automatic	  threat	  of	  disinvestment	  that	  requires	  no	  agency	  on	  the	  part	  of	  business	  firms.	  
This	  innovation,	  as	  remarked	  earlier,	  represents	  a	  return	  to	  earlier	  notions	  of	  the	  concept,	  





We	  anticipate	  three	  sorts	  of	  challenges	  to	  our	  proposed	  conceptualization	  of	  structural	  
power	  as	  a	  strategic	  resource.	  The	  first	  is	  that,	  if	  this	  power	  is	  really	  obvious	  and	  
structural,	  why	  does	  it	  need	  to	  be	  used	  strategically	  at	  all?	  Why	  do	  politicians	  simply	  not	  
adjust	  their	  expectations	  accordingly	  and	  automatically	  make	  the	  best	  offer	  they	  know	  
they	  can	  get	  their	  banks	  to	  accept?	  Such	  an	  objection	  can	  only	  come	  from	  a	  scholar	  who	  
stood	  at	  great	  distance	  from	  the	  uncertainty	  that	  surrounded	  the	  bank	  bailouts	  of	  2008.	  
Policymakers	  and	  bankers	  were	  highly	  uncertain	  about	  each	  other’s	  intentions	  and	  
resources.	  The	  British	  government	  tried	  to	  achieve	  its	  best	  solution,	  which	  involved	  
including	  all	  banks	  in	  the	  recapitalization	  agreement,	  but	  only	  then	  did	  policymakers	  
discover	  that	  HSBC	  would	  refuse,	  and	  that	  policymakers	  could	  not	  credibly	  threaten	  the	  
bank.	  Likewise,	  American	  policymakers	  were	  not	  certain,	  going	  into	  the	  meeting	  with	  the	  
nine	  leading	  bank	  CEOs,	  that	  all	  banks	  would	  accept	  the	  deal.	  So	  they	  marshaled	  their	  
regulatory	  might	  and	  personnel	  to	  remind	  the	  American	  banks	  of	  their	  dependence	  on	  
American	  regulators.	  To	  insist	  that	  structural	  power	  has	  to	  take	  place	  only	  in	  the	  heads	  of	  
politicians,	  as	  automatic	  adjustment,	  is	  to	  claim	  that	  structural	  power	  cannot	  be	  invoked	  
in	  negotiations.	  This	  is	  an	  untenable	  theoretical	  proposition.	  Structural	  power	  is	  entirely	  
consistent	  with	  deliberate	  political	  action.	  
	  
We	  are	  not	  the	  only	  scholars	  to	  argue	  that	  structural	  power	  can	  require	  the	  use	  of	  
agency.64	  And	  it	  is	  from	  this	  theoretical	  position,	  largely	  occupied	  by	  constructivist	  
scholars,	  that	  we	  anticipate	  two	  other	  potential	  objections.	  First,	  if	  structural	  power	  can	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be	  strategically	  deployed,	  and	  if	  instrumental	  power	  can	  have	  automatic	  features,	  then	  is	  
there	  any	  useful	  distinction	  between	  structural	  and	  instrumental	  power?	  “Being	  
instrumentally	  powerful	  can	  make	  business	  appear	  structurally	  powerful,”	  as	  Hindmoor	  
and	  McGeechan	  put	  it,	  calling	  into	  question	  the	  analytical	  utility	  of	  the	  distinction.65	  
Secondly,	  as	  Stephen	  Bell	  has	  observed,	  theories	  of	  structural	  power	  require	  greater	  
attention	  to	  the	  way	  in	  which	  politicians	  interpret	  that	  power,	  and	  how	  the	  perceptions	  of	  
politicians	  and	  the	  public	  can	  change	  over	  time,	  thus	  changing	  the	  structural	  power	  that	  
automatically	  accrues	  to	  business.66	  Thus,	  potentially	  all	  structural	  power	  involves	  the	  use	  
of	  strategic	  action.	  	  
	  
The	  original	  distinction	  between	  business	  power	  as	  a	  resource	  acquired	  through	  lobbying,	  
on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  business	  power	  as	  a	  resource	  that	  accrues	  to	  firms	  because	  of	  their	  
position	  in	  the	  economy,	  on	  the	  other,	  remains	  a	  theoretical	  difference	  with	  real	  world	  
policy	  implications.	  Political	  scientists	  need	  to	  put	  more	  attention	  on	  this	  distinction,	  not	  
less,	  because	  it	  involves	  two	  different	  views	  of	  how	  power	  is	  consequential	  in	  politics.	  
According	  to	  the	  lobbying	  view,	  banks	  are	  powerful	  because	  they	  can	  buy	  the	  best	  lawyers	  
and	  lobbyists	  to	  defend	  their	  interests.67	  Political	  debates	  animated	  by	  this	  perspective	  
focus,	  for	  example,	  on	  the	  laws	  regulating	  spending	  in	  politics.	  The	  structural	  view,	  by	  
contrast,	  focuses	  attention	  on	  questions	  regulating	  the	  size	  of	  banks,	  which	  can	  make	  
them	  too	  big	  to	  fail.	  It	  also	  highlights	  the	  importance	  of	  international	  cooperation,	  
through	  which	  governments	  can	  try	  to	  build	  international	  rules	  that	  limit	  the	  ability	  of	  




As	  for	  the	  argument	  that	  even	  the	  automatic	  structural	  power	  of	  business	  is	  always	  in	  part	  
constructed	  by	  agents	  in	  the	  world:	  we	  agree.	  What	  goes	  on	  in	  the	  minds	  of	  politicians,	  
and	  what	  they	  take	  as	  given	  in	  assuming	  business	  responses	  to	  tax	  policy,	  is	  certainly	  a	  
question	  of	  interpretation,	  not	  simply	  an	  objective	  fact	  that	  is	  given	  unambiguously	  by	  
economic	  structure.69	  Our	  concern	  with	  this	  approach	  is	  largely	  methodological,	  because	  
it	  involves	  empirically	  assessing	  what	  is	  going	  on	  inside	  the	  heads	  of	  policymakers.	  
Automatic	  structural	  power	  changes	  when	  conditions	  change,	  as	  politicians	  alter	  their	  
evaluation	  of	  the	  credibility	  of	  a	  threat	  of	  business	  disinvestment	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  different	  
economic	  events.	  But	  even	  so,	  its	  short-­‐term	  function	  is	  largely	  automatic	  and	  
unobservable	  empirically;	  only	  its	  policy	  consequences	  can	  be	  observed.	  	  
	  
The	  strategic	  use	  of	  structural	  power	  is	  conceptually	  distinct	  from	  the	  automatic	  use	  of	  
business	  power.	  Strategic	  structural	  power	  can	  observed	  through	  its	  effect	  in	  
negotiations,	  of	  which	  there	  is	  an	  empirical	  record.	  It	  can	  be	  readily	  demonstrated	  
through	  process-­‐tracing	  that	  is	  embedded	  in	  an	  analysis	  of	  market	  position	  and	  of	  bank-­‐
government	  interaction.	  As	  such,	  it	  is	  a	  distinction	  that	  will	  allow	  other	  scholars	  to	  test	  
our	  propositions	  about	  the	  dependence	  of	  companies	  on	  national	  regulatory	  authority	  in	  
a	  globalized	  economy.	  	  This	  analytical	  innovation	  does	  not	  exclude	  that	  other	  scholars	  
can	  productively	  explore	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  possibility	  of	  disinvestment	  is	  constructed	  




Substantively,	  our	  analysis	  implies	  that	  large	  firms	  are	  empowered	  not	  only	  by	  the	  
possibility	  of	  moving	  capital	  from	  one	  jurisdiction	  to	  another	  (the	  legal	  exit	  option),	  but	  
also	  by	  the	  ability	  to	  absorb	  regulatory	  sanctioning	  costs	  in	  a	  given	  economy	  (the	  viable	  
outside	  option).	  Where	  companies	  make	  much	  of	  their	  revenue	  in	  one	  country,	  those	  
potential	  profits	  represent	  power	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  national	  regulatory	  authorities.	  The	  
giants	  of	  American	  finance	  were	  well	  aware	  of	  the	  cost	  of	  not	  playing	  ball	  with	  a	  national	  
regulator.	  Political	  scientists	  have	  paid	  extensive	  attention	  to	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  exit	  
option	  makes	  mobile	  capital	  more	  powerful	  in	  political	  negotiations,	  and	  this	  has	  been	  
the	  source	  of	  important	  insights.70	  Yet	  the	  possibility	  of	  mobility	  may	  be	  illusory	  when	  the	  
costs	  of	  leaving	  are	  high.	  For	  example,	  an	  increasing	  number	  of	  economies	  –	  the	  
European	  Union	  and	  Switzerland	  are	  only	  the	  most	  recent	  examples	  –	  have	  passed	  laws	  or	  
initiatives	  that	  seek	  to	  regulate	  executive	  compensation.	  Large	  financial	  institutions	  
routinely	  invoke	  the	  threat	  of	  exit	  from	  these	  jurisdictions	  in	  response,	  just	  as	  they	  did	  in	  
the	  United	  States	  after	  the	  passage	  of	  new	  financial	  legislation	  adopting	  shareholder	  
rights	  to	  vote	  on	  pay	  packages.	  The	  threatened	  exodus	  has	  yet	  to	  appear;	  moreover,	  it	  
appears	  to	  have	  had	  little	  effect	  on	  lawmakers.	  When	  the	  United	  States	  and	  the	  European	  
Union	  and	  Switzerland	  all	  adopt	  tough	  new	  regulations	  on	  executive	  pay,	  it	  is	  an	  open	  
question	  whether	  financiers	  in	  these	  jurisdictions	  will	  be	  willing	  to	  follow	  up	  their	  threats	  
to	  move	  to	  Asia.	  	  
	  	  
Episodes	  such	  as	  the	  financial	  crisis	  of	  2008	  are	  rare	  political	  events.	  Because	  they	  open	  
the	  possibility	  for	  such	  potential	  long-­‐term	  damage,	  they	  reveal	  how	  state	  policymakers	  
51	  
	  
and	  powerful	  private	  interests	  bargain	  under	  time	  pressure	  and	  over	  high	  stakes.	  The	  
instrumental	  power	  of	  financial	  institutions	  in	  these	  conditions	  is	  less	  important	  than	  
their	  structural	  power.	  Large	  banks	  are	  privileged	  actors	  in	  all	  capitalist	  countries,	  but	  
even	  privileged	  actors	  in	  an	  open	  economy	  must	  still	  contend	  with	  the	  costs	  that	  
regulators	  can	  impose	  on	  them.	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